

## FINDING OF FACTS PART 2.

### HIJACKING ON NOVEMBER 1, 2006.

This report deals with the F.B.I. And the U.S Government.

The U.S. Had several opportunities to redeem the five hostages.\*

1. On the first day of the hijacking, an Iraqi doctor went to the F.B.I. Office in Baghdad and told agents he could take them to the place where the hostages were being held, but after he had done this, he, his wife, and his child would need safe passage out of Iraq. The F.B.I. Refused to take advantage of the doctor's offer.

2. At about the same time, two brothers from Basra went to the F.B.I. Office in Baghdad. They claimed to know where the five hostages and two Iraqi hijackers who had been wounded by friendly fire were being held. The brothers offered to take agents to the location; in return, the brothers wanted safe passage out of Iraq for themselves, their mother, one wife, and three children to any country, preferably in Europe but the U.S. Was acceptable too. The brothers' offer was good for only five days.

When one of the injured Iraqis died, the other hijackers had to move the hostages to another place. This would explain the blood cited in the debriefing report (Hi-jacking Incident 16th November 2006.) from one of C/S/G Personnel

3. On the day of the hijacking, the Basra police informed the Crescent Security Group (CSG) that they could retrieve the captive contractors if CSG would pay off some fines it had incurred. The Crescent Security Group instructed the British forces to rescue the hostages from the Basra Police Headquarters. The British appeared on the premises, but the Iraqi police had been tipped off and removed the hostage's minutes before the raid took place. However, British troops found other hostages held in the Basra Police Headquarters.

4. On or about January 2007, one of Mark Koscielski's contacts agreed to go to Safwan to communicate with two Iraqis at LO1, a base where materiel and supplies are kept before being loaded on to convoys. The contact had dealt with these Iraqis in the past: the trust that had developed among them made him 95% certain that they would give him the Intel that would enable the U.S. To get the hostages back. The F.B.I. Dallied for almost six months before contacting him, and the agency did so only because the families pressured the F.B.I. To do so. When the F.B.I. Finally did communicate with the contact, agents told him that the F.B.I. Would not support such a mission.

5. March 12<sup>th</sup> 2008. One of my reliable sources had contact with the provider of the video tapes of the hostages at his home in Baghdad. This was in reference to the five fingers. My source said the provider was very very very upset. Provide told my source that this wouldn't have happen if they had a partner on the other side. (F.B.I.) This is why the provider said that they release the video tapes to open negotiations with the F.B.I. In Baghdad. That didn't happen.

\* Over the many months of the hostage's crisis I had the opportunity to interview many past and current U.S and Austrian government personal as well as civilians that has direct knowledge of the hi-jacking on Nov. 16<sup>th</sup> 2006.

**Mark Koscielski**

**4-14-08**